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Providing a “challenge function”: Government
social researchers in the UK’s Department of
Energy and Climate Change (2010–2015)
Michael Kattirtzi1
ABSTRACT Recent research in Science and Technology Studies (STS) and related fields
has scrutinized UK policy institutions’ governance of technical policy domains, revealing the
prevalence of naïve assumptions about citizens’ engagement with science and technology.
Government officials are characterized as wedded to institutional commitments and averse to
criticism. From that perspective, technical policy issues such as energy and climate change
are addressed without the sufficient interrogation of assumptions about citizens. This study,
based on an analysis of 15 interviews with civil servants and over 40 documents (including
evidence reviews, policy reports, stakeholder publications and parliamentary records), pre-
sents a more varied picture within the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC)
during the years of the Conservative and Liberal Democrat Coalition Government (2010–
2015). It focuses on two priority policy areas of the time: the Green Deal and the installation
of smart meters in UK homes. It is shown that government social researchers in DECC have
aided policy officials to rethink their understandings of citizens. Social researchers have
achieved this through their institutionalized commitment to providing an evidence-based
“challenge function”. I conclude that policy development on technical topics is more likely to
be effective if policy officials engage with social researchers at an early stage, and if social
researchers receive senior civil service representation and support. This article is published as
part of a collection on scientific advice to governments.
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Introduction
For many years, researchers in STS have raised concerns withwestern governments’ engagement with scientific advice inpolicy areas relating to science and technology. A key strand
of work has revealed how scientistic and technologically
determinist assumptions about citizens pervade policy-making
processes, such that decisions are made with insufficient
consideration of how different groups in society might respond
to experts’ knowledge claims or new technologies (Winner, 1992;
Jasanoff, 2004; Irwin, 2013). Citizens are imagined to behave in
highly predictable and uniform ways, and motivated by the same
concerns, desires and values as decision makers (Winner, 1992:
359, Kearnes et al., 2006: 299).
Where STS authors offer explanations for UK policymakers’
apparent ignorance of citizens’ diverse perspectives and engage-
ment with science and technology, they often invoke the claim
that organizational structures and narrow, “instrumental ratio-
nales” preclude government officials from reflecting on such
matters (Wynne, 1993; Chilvers and Macnaghten, 2011: 539;
Pallett and Chilvers, 2013). This, coupled with other social
scientists’ depictions of civil servants in the UK Government as
averse to criticism (LSE GV314 Group, 2014, citing Norris, 1995),
paints a rather pessimistic picture of the potential for better
understandings of citizens to inform and influence policymakers’
work in technical policy areas.
This article nuances the picture somewhat, by elucidating a
previously unexamined means by which scientistic and techno-
logically determinist assumptions have been influentially chal-
lenged within the UK’s civil service. It does this by exploring how
civil servants have conceived and operationalized the idea of a
“challenge function” with respect to the role of social science
expertise in the Department of Energy and Climate Change,
during the years of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition
Government (2010–2015). Specifically, it explores the experiences
of analysts within the department who belong to the Government
Social Research Service (henceforth “GSR”).
Government social researchers are a group of analysts in the
civil service who are employed in government departments and
agencies to provide social science advice (HM Government,
2016). To become a formally accredited government social
researcher, one must undergo a written examination and
interview. These analysts are typically responsible for commis-
sioning social research projects, engaging with external experts
and translating analysis into the policy process. This can involve
exploring an evidence base for alternative courses of action,
assessing how the impacts of different options may be distributed
across society and/or designing and commissioning policy
evaluation. By focusing on government social researchers within
DECC, this article argues that challenge is more prevalent and
influential in policy areas dominated by scientific and technolo-
gical issues than might be expected given the above cited
literature.
The idea of providing a “challenge function” is engrained in the
guidance provided to all analysts who work in the civil service by
the formal accreditation bodies which support them. Government
scientists, engineers, economists, statisticians, social researchers
and operational analysts are all expected to use their expertise to
challenge their colleagues’ ideas and assumptions (for examples
from the Government Social Research Service, see GSR Unit,
2006; Campbell et al., 2007; for examples from other analytical
schools see, Government Economic Service, 2007; Government
Science & Engineering, 2013). Indeed, as part of the formal
process for assessing individual researchers’ suitability for
promotion, an analyst’s record for providing challenge is
explicitly considered (for example, Government Social Research
Service, 2010). In this way, individual researchers are assigned
responsibility for providing a challenge function within their area
of work.
Yet, the Government Office for Science (“GO-Science”) has
found that government analysts do not always challenge their
colleagues’ claims when they judge them to conflict with their
understanding of the available evidence (2013: 20). Consistent
with an individualized understanding of the challenge function,
they account for this in terms of analysts’ personal failings, such
as a lack of willingness or confidence, and cite a personal tension
between an analyst’s commitment to supporting the organization
on the one hand and putting their head above the parapet in a
way that could damage their own career on the other
(Government Office for Science, 2012: 20, 31). The implication
is that analysts’ performance of challenge relies upon their
judgement as to whether the evidence will be appreciated or not
by colleagues—but nothing is said of the conditions which affect
whether it is likely to be well-received or not.
As Owens (2015: 150) has written with respect to the Royal
Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP), interdisciplin-
ary challenge between committee members inspires learning,
enables deeper debate about the assumptions and contingencies
underlying a particular framing of an issue, encourages experts to
reflect on alternative solutions or problem framings, and
ultimately improves the quality of scientific advice provided.
Her analysis highlights what is lost in GO-Science’s overly
individualistic account of the challenge function: an appreciation
of the “circumstances of influence” (Owens, 2015: 124), which
underpin its effective operation. Acknowledging this requires us
to go beyond individual attributes such as confidence or
willingness. We must pay attention to the social and material
conditions that shape the type of influence that analysts can wield
in a team. In her analysis, Owens (2015: 164–168) emphasizes
that the receptivity of the RCEP’s advice among policy audiences
depended upon not only the commission’s rhetorical and
strategic approaches to dissemination, but also upon government
officials’ perceptions of the RCEP’s expertise, legitimacy and
autonomy, as well as a range of political, institutional and
economic contingencies that conspire either favourably or against
the salience of the commission’s advice at a given time.
In a similar vein, this article highlights a wide range of factors
beyond individuals’ willingness or confidence that shape analysts’
provision of internal challenge in the civil service, through a close
examination of social researchers’ engagement with two policy
areas in DECC. As we will see, key factors include: the relative
status of analysts within the organizational and epistemic
hierarchies in the civil service, the support and encouragement
they receive from colleagues, and their access to relevant
knowledge and resources. These factors, which play out in
contingent circumstances, are distributed across communities
and networks rather than being intentional characteristics
associated with individual analysts. Appreciating this can help
us to understand what can enable or inhibit successful challenge
within UK policy institutions, and provide a more comprehensive
basis on which to consider how the influence of analysts’
challenge function within a policy institution could be
strengthened.
The paper proceeds as follows: after outlining the methodology
used to generate and analyse the data presented here, I provide a
background to the emergence of social researchers within the
Department of Energy and Climate Change. Then each of the
following two sections focuses on a key policy area during the
Coalition Government years in which social researchers worked
closely with policy colleagues (the Green Deal and smart meters
implementation). These sections highlight the circumstances in
which the analysts provided challenge and consider the extent of
influence their advice commanded. The penultimate section
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identifies some constraints on social researchers’ ability to
exercise challenge, before a concluding discussion of the findings
in relation to the literature on UK policy institutions’ under-
standing of citizens in technical policy domains.
Methodology
This study reports findings from a project that explores the role of
government social researchers in DECC. The analysis presented
here is based upon semi-structured interviews with 15 civil
servants, which is commensurate with related studies in policy
settings (for example, Rhodes, 2005; Pallett and Chilvers, 2013).
The officials were predominantly current or former employees in
DECC. Ten of them self-identified as social researchers, while the
rest held positions in other analysis or policy-related posts. Most
of the social researchers were experienced “middle-management”
officials at grade 6 or 7—as is typical for the profession—but a
handful of senior civil service researchers and other colleagues in
DECC were also interviewed.
Middle-management civil servants’ personal details are rarely
listed in departmental publications or official records in the UK.
Therefore, a handful of actors who played instrumental roles at
different points in the department’s history were initially
identified through an online search of keywords (e.g. “social
research”, “customer insight”, “policy evaluation”, “social science”
and “DECC”), and through chance encounters at academic events
prior to starting fieldwork. The rest were then selected through a
process of “snowballing” (Bryman, 2004: 334)—with a degree of
“purposive sampling” (Punch, 2014: 161) to ensure that enough
material was obtained for focused case studies on specific
policy areas.
Data generated in this way were iteratively triangulated
(Stoecker, 1991: 92) with an analysis of over 40 publicly available
government documents (such as policy reports, findings from
social research projects, economic impact assessments, politicians’
speeches, guidance for government analysts and parliamentary
records). These provided additional insights into the context in
which social researchers operated. Documents were selected
through a combination of online searches and the suggestions of
interviewees. In vivo coding (Corbin and Strauss, 2008: 160)
using NVivo software revealed the strong associations between
social researchers and the provision of challenge in DECC, and
inspired this study.
By beginning the transcription and analysis of data during the
interview stage (following Miles and Huberman, 1984: 49), I was
able to spot emerging gaps in my understanding and address
them so as to eventually reach data saturation within specific
policy areas (Corbin and Strauss, 2008: 148). The examples
discussed in the sections “Social research and DECC” and “Social
research and the Green Deal” were chosen for the relatively high
degree of influence achieved by social researchers under the
circumstances, and for the breadth of material obtained on the
topic. The internal validity of findings was strengthened through
the assistance of current and former civil servants in DECC, who
checked an earlier draft of the paper for factual inaccuracies while
respecting the researcher’s independence over questions of
subject matter, analytical perspective and interpretation. Any
remaining errors are my own.
Social research and DECC
There is no formal requirement for policymakers to consult social
researchers, nor to seek out their analytical challenge, and
therefore there was nothing compelling DECC’s senior officials to
employ social researchers when it was first formed. DECC was
created in October 2008 in what has been described as a
technocratic period of policy-making with respect to climate
change mitigation (MacKerron, 2009: 87). Its remit was
predominantly framed in economics and engineering terms—to
ensure the security and cost effectiveness of energy markets, and
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the most efficient
way (National Audit Office, 2009: 8). The senior officials saw
no clear case for employing social researchers to aid policy design
and development in this remit. Nor were there any social
researchers already based within the teams that came to
comprise DECC: the energy generation and infrastructure teams
within the then Department for Business, Enterprise and
Regulatory Reform (DBERR) and the energy efficiency and
climate change teams from the Department for Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). The officials from DBERR
previously had minimal engagement with social research while
DEFRA’s civil servants did work closely with social researchers,
but the latter were situated in a separate central analytical
team with cross-cutting responsibilities. Hence, when these
teams moved to DECC no social researchers were included
among them.
Interviewees reported that, within the first few months,
concerns about the department’s lack of in-house social research
expertise were expressed by social researchers in DEFRA and by
the Head of the GSR Service across government. Some of DECC’s
own natural scientists and policy officials also drew on their
experience in DEFRA to argue that the department needed social
researchers to contribute to policy development, specifically for
their recognized expertise with respect to understanding and
influencing citizens’ behaviours—a specialism that had recently
acquired prominence amongst policymakers (Halpern et al.,
2004; Darnton, 2008). But without support from the most senior
officials within DECC, their case was inconsequential.
The situation changed after the first year, due to a routine
review of the department organized by the Head of the Home
Civil Service (Cabinet Office, 2009). This capability review was
described by respondents as carrying significant weight among
senior officials. It analysed the department’s allocation of
resources with regards to defined criteria, taking into account
the views of internal and external stakeholders. The review
identified a lack of expertise typically associated with government
social researchers, as follows:
Stakeholders and staff told us that DECC’s knowledge of
customers is weak and the Department is badly in need of
social and behavioural research capability. The Department
recognises that an in-depth understanding of consumer
behaviour and how to influence it is an essential prerequisite
for meeting the consumer-related targets on climate change.
(Cabinet Office, 2009: 8)
It thus gave legitimacy to the case for acquiring social science
expertise in DECC—especially with regards to the behavioural
research that social researchers previously worked within DEFRA.
Still, this was not enough to ensure that DECC would recruit
government social researchers or expose officials to social
researchers’ challenge. Government social researchers were not
the only group of civil servants who claimed expertise in
understanding and influencing citizens’ behaviour. Reportedly
due to the preference of senior officials, who were probably
influenced by the Cabinet Office’s new Customer Insight Forum
promoting the use of “customer insight” across government,
DECC’s leadership decided that the gap in expertise should be
addressed by building a team of customer insight specialists. This
was a new body of civil servants who apply marketing and
communications techniques to disseminate amongst officials an
understanding of citizens in the context of their everyday lives
(Cabinet Office, 2006). Customer insight specialists do not share
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government analysts’ commitment to providing challenge, nor
are individuals’ competencies assessed based on this.
Commitment to challenge aside, there are strong similarities
between customer insight and social research. Like social
research, customer insight is intended to improve policy designs
by “providing a rich and deep understanding of our customers,
their needs and what we can do to help ensure our services fit
usefully into their lives” (Cabinet Office, 2006: 9). Moreover,
customer insight specialists make use of social research methods
such as interviews, surveys and observation.
Yet, the Customer Insight Forum defines the “discipline” in
contradistinction to social research (Cabinet Office, 2006: 9).
They emphasize that customer insight requires a “leap” beyond
social research by developing rich narratives about people that
can make policies and services resonate with an intended
audience (Cabinet Office, 2006: 9). In addition to conventional
social research data sources, customer insight specialists may also
develop narratives from the experiences of staff, media stories and
current affairs or through engaging citizens (Government
Communications Network, n.d.).
From the Customer Insight Forum’s view, the value of
customer insight is “not linked to the specific tools that have
been used to generate it, but to its ability to tell a single, clear and
compelling story” (Cabinet Office, 2006: 9). This has arguably left
the specialism vulnerable to being viewed as less methodologically
sound than social research—an opinion reportedly held across a
wide range of civil servants:
And within government, people would look at social
researchers as somehow possessing of more intellect and
somehow more robust credentials. And customer insight was a
little fluffy, a little bit softer really. (A former social researcher
in DECC (1)).
The formation of a Customer Insight Team was thus slightly
different from what the Government Social Research Unit and
many of DECC’s own civil servants were arguing for. But due to a
fortuitous coincidence, the creation of this team did bring social
researchers into the department to contribute to policy develop-
ment and implementation through challenge based on evidence
about citizens.
The department’s first Head of Customer Insight was recruited
from a research consultancy in spring 2010, where the specialist
gained years of experience conducting research about citizens in
relation to energy and environment issues. Also in spring 2010,
the Chief Economist appointed a social researcher to help officials
design and conduct policy evaluations. The Head of Customer
Insight and the social researcher soon met and found common-
alities in their approaches and objectives. With the social
researcher’s support, and in acknowledgement of the GSR
community’s reputation for quality, the Head of Customer
Insight committed to adhering to GSR standards and sought to
build her team through employing accredited social researchers
(Government Office for Science, 2012, Annex A: 96). This official
subsequently gained GSR accreditation in 2013. As such, under
this specialist’s leadership, the Customer Insight Team took a
hybrid customer insight-social research form; with a commitment
to using GSR-approved research methods to develop and share
deeper insights into people’s views and activities, and with a
dedication to providing challenge.
From summer 2010 onwards then, DECC started to employ
social researchers—particularly to help civil servants to under-
stand citizens and to design and deliver policy evaluations. The
next two sections focus on two of the earliest examples in which
social researchers have worked with policy teams in DECC: the
Green Deal and smart meters implementation. These policy areas
are similar in that they were priorities under the Coalition
Government, were managed by officials in the teams from
DEFRA, and rely upon successful engagement with citizens across
society for their success. An important difference is that the
Green Deal requires energy consumers to opt in (DECC, 2010a),
whereas energy suppliers will offer to install smart meters for all
customers for free (DECC, 2013).
Social research and the Green Deal
The Green Deal was a “flagship” policy of the Coalition
Government between 2010 and 2015. It was based on the idea
of a pay-as-you-save scheme, in which citizens could borrow
money for the purposes of improving the energy efficiency of
their home, saving them money on their utility bills (DECC,
2010a). Householders would repay the privately-lent finance over
an agreed number of years as savings accrue in terms of
reductions in bills. The policy’s origins lie in a paper by the UK
Green Building Council (2009), and was listed in each of the three
major parties’ political manifestos prior to the general election in
2010 (Conservative Party, 2010; Labour Party, 2010; Liberal
Democrats, 2010).
The Green Deal was celebrated by Coalition Government
ministers in 2010 as “the most ambitious energy-saving plan ever
put forward” (Huhne, 2010). It was presented as a policy
instrument that would stimulate a “revolution” in domestic
energy efficiency—and one that would appeal to “every home in
Britain”. It would support the retrofitting of 14 million homes by
2020, and generate hundreds of thousands of jobs until 2030
(DECC, 2010b). Looking beyond politicians’ rhetoric, DECC’s
first Green Deal economic impact assessment was similarly
ambitious. Under a “high” uptake scenario, 11.5 million measures
would be installed in homes across the United Kingdom by 2020,
with the expectation that multiple measures will be installed in
some homes (DECC, 2010c: 19). In this scenario, projected
reductions in non-traded carbon emissions amounted to
4.9 MtCO2e by 2020 (DECC, 2010c: 19). The “low uptake”
scenario projected that the scheme would result in the installation
of 7.1 million measures by 2020, saving 3.3 MtCO2e in non-
traded carbon emissions.
The success of this policy hinged on positive reception from
citizens. Aware of this, DECC did work with the Energy Saving
Trust to commission pilots of pay-as-you-save schemes as early as
2009 (DECC & Energy Saving Trust, 2011). But the Green Deal
was not designed with a particular audience in mind, nor with a
recognition that different consumers could be motivated to
engage with the scheme differently. The ideas of saving money
and reducing carbon emissions were continuously invoked as if
they would have universal appeal—a “no brainer” for all
households in society (Huhne, 2010; DECC, 2011a; 2012a).
These assumptions were not originally identified as problematic
in a department in which senior officials did not, at first, see a
need for social research expertise to inform policy development
and implementation processes within the organization.
As discussed in the previous section, a Customer Insight Team
that would employ social researchers began to be built in mid-
2010. When the first members of the Customer Insight Team
joined DECC, they were situated within the Green Deal team.
Interviewees explained that this was because officials saw the
Green Deal as a top-priority policy area, and one in which a
deeper understanding of consumer views was considered useful
for maximizing the scheme’s success. It was too late for the social
researchers to contribute towards the design of the scheme, but
they could help the officials to prepare for its implementation.
Working closely with policy officials and seeking to prove the
value of their contributions to the department, the researchers’
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first projects were designed to understand how citizens perceived the
idea of a pay-as-you-save scheme. Three research reports were
commissioned and produced between late 2010 and early 2011,
which brought to the policy team’s attention specific issues
concerning consumer uptake (DECC, 2011b, c, d). These studies
revealed that the Green Deal scheme was most likely to appeal to
those citizens who already saw a need to improve their home’s
energy efficiency. They also found that many people would be
reluctant to pay for energy efficiency measures using borrowed
finance – especially if that finance is tied to the house and could not
be repaid faster than the agreed payment term. These findings
achieved some immediate influence in the form of “visible, short-
term responses” (Owens, 2015: 127), as noted by a social researcher:
I think all of the Green Deal work was quite influential—like,
showing that the demand for Green Deal was likely to be quite
low probably led to a massive kind of push on trying to make
it more appealing from a policy perspective—I’m not saying
that it was only the social research that did it, but I think they
were kind of clear examples. (A former social researcher in
DECC (2)).
Adjustments to the scheme that followed from these insights
included enabling customers to pay back the debt early, and an
additional investment of £200 m from the Treasury Office to help
maximize its reach through the provision of introductory offers
for new customers. In addition, the findings were incorporated in
the next economic impact assessment, resulting in the revising
down of the expected number of installations to approximately
3.6 million by 2020 (DECC, 2011e: 75).
The social research projects also planted some seeds of doubt
over the assumption that the Green Deal would appeal to all types
of people in society:
We’d done some research on the general population, we
understood quite a lot about people’s motivations and barriers
to energy efficiency, but we soon began to realize that actually
this isn’t a one-size-fits-all policy really. We don’t understand
enough about what sorts of groups exist and how they might
respond differently to the policy. It’s quite, you know, unique
for a ‘product’—which is almost what it is—to be targeted at
everyone. Most kinds of things wouldn’t be targeted at
everyone. (A former social researcher in DECC (3)).
From late 2011 the government faced an on-going stream of
criticism from journalists, opposition politicians, energy compa-
nies and academics, who warned that the Green Deal would fail
because it lacked support from high street retailers, it was too
complicated for consumers, and the cost of repayment would be
too expensive1 (Cuff, 2012; Eyre and Rosenow, 2012; Gosden,
2012).
In this context, and having already built a strong rapport with
the Green Deal team, the social researchers challenged the
assumption that this scheme could appeal to all types of
householders across society without being tailored for different
audiences. They persuaded their policy team colleagues to
commission a segmentation model that would enable the
government to make the communications campaigns more
salient to the Green Deal’s most likely customers. For this,
survey participants who expressed an interest in energy insulation
were divided up according to the reasons that were most likely to
motivate them to take up the Green Deal (DECC, 2012b). Six
segments were identified, and ranked according to the likely
salience of the Green Deal to each group—ranging from “money
savers” and “carbon savers” to the “overstretched”. These
segments were in turn used to design advertising campaigns
targeted at particular audiences—which featured, for instance,
in-home improvement publications and national newspapers.
The Green Deal scheme was launched fully in January 2013. A
total of 20,000 measures were installed under a Green Deal plan
by the end of 2015 (National Audit Office, 2016: 4), that is,
millions less than even the “low” uptake scenario of 2010. The
scheme was closed to new applicants in July 2015 by the new
Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, Amber Rudd,
on the grounds that it did not offer value for money for taxpayers
(DECC, 2015a). A range of reasons have been invoked to explain
the apparent failure of the Green Deal: the interest rate on loans
and associated costs were described as too high for customers,
the scheme was thought to be too complex, and consumer
engagement was considered poor—particularly because of a
“failure to understand the behavioural barriers preventing wide-
scale take-up of energy efficiency measures” (House of Commons
Energy and Climate Change Committee, 2016: 13). But thanks to
effective evidence-based challenge from social researchers, the
Green Deal policy officials now also see that it was problematic to
assume that this particular scheme would have universal appeal
across groups in society without targeting it at a defined customer
group—or targeting it differently to different groups. Reflecting
on this, a policy official recently commented that:
there probably was a market for the Green Deal but it was
somewhere in between people in fuel poverty who probably
wouldn’t be able to afford it and where it might not be
appropriate to take out a loan, and others who could afford to
do it without a loan (A policy official in DECC (1)).
The same official added that recognizing the variation among
the population would lead them to target approximately four
million households, rather than all households in the United
Kingdom. In this sense, social researchers’ challenge function has
contributed towards a gradual change in the policy framing,
towards a model where energy efficiency schemes are designed by
starting with an understanding of diverse perspectives and
interests among citizens. This would involve identifying different
groups in society and developing an energy efficiency scheme
with the knowledge of how different groups are likely to respond
to it from the outset. And now that DECC has the in-house social
research expertise for this, the department is better placed to aid
the design and delivery of such a policy than it was in 2009.2
Social research and smart meters
A second policy area where social researchers provided an
important challenge function is smart meters implementation—
but this time their challenge was directed more towards energy
suppliers than to their internal colleagues. A smart meter records
and transmits energy consumption data to a property’s energy
supplier (DECC, 2013). With an in-home display, householders
can use smart meters to monitor their energy consumption, and
government ministers considered this a key means by which
carbon emissions could be reduced (DECC, 2011f). In summer
2009, the European Union ruled that member states should
introduce smart meter-type technology, subject to a favourable
economic analysis of the costs and benefits (Council Regulation
(EC), 2009). But, as with the Green Deal, the realization of energy
savings and reductions in carbon emissions relied upon
engagement from citizens.
DECC’s economic assessment estimated that smart meters
would bring significant consumer benefits to households,
primarily in terms of stimulating reductions in energy use and
therefore in utility bills (DECC, 2011f). This cost-benefit analysis
was informed by academic studies providing evidence that under
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some circumstances, the introduction of feedback devices in
homes could help consumers to reduce their energy use by as
much as 10–15% in a year (Darby, 2006; Fischer, 2008).
Acknowledging a wide range of estimates in the existing
literature, the authors of the economic assessment adopted
relatively conservative assumptions about the likely annual
reductions in demand: 2.8% reductions in electricity demand,
2% reductions in gas consumption for users on a credit-based
system, and 0.5% for gas users with pre-payment meters (DECC,
2011f: 30). However, by the time this assessment was produced in
March 2011, DECC’s analysts did not provide detailed plans on
how these savings would be achieved in the proposed national
roll-out. Nor was there any clear strategy on how the installation
process and subsequent consumer engagement activities could be
arranged to maximize the amount and duration of households’
energy savings.
Nonetheless, the foundation phase of the national roll-out had
now commenced, which meant that energy suppliers were
permitted to begin installing smart meters in homes around the
United Kingdom. The foundation stage was scheduled to end in
spring 2014, before which the government planned to create the
supporting communications infrastructure, set technical stan-
dards for smart metering units and specify licence obligations on
suppliers (DECC, 2011f: 18). The mass roll-out stage would then
start, before which energy suppliers would not be expected to
comply with government guidance or obligations, since these
were still in development.
In June 2011, the National Audit Office (an independent body
that scrutinizes government expenditure) raised concerns about
the government’s plans for the smart meter roll-out, pointing to
uncertainty over the amount of savings consumers will make, and
how long they would benefit for (National Audit Office, 2011).
This put additional pressure on the department to ensure that
consumer benefits would be realized to the greatest extent
possible.
Social researchers joined the smart meters implementation
team in spring 2011, to design an evaluation of energy suppliers’
mandated installation of smart devices and in-home displays
across UK households. In line with the National Audit Office’s
(2011: 11) recommendations, it was important for social
researchers and their internal colleagues that the realization of
consumer benefits would be evaluated during the foundation
phase, so that lessons could be taken forward and changes made
where necessary.
Energy supplier representatives’ perspectives on evaluation
differed from that of the government officials’. Their priority was
to ensure they achieved a target number of installations with a
high degree of customer satisfaction, while protecting commer-
cially sensitive information about their roll-out strategies and
minimizing the possibility for any external factors to burden or
complicate the process (AECOM, 2011: 2). These commercial
interests and desires to protect information threatened to thwart
social researchers’ plans to learn from the earliest installations.
Committed to performing a strong challenge function however,
they negotiated an arrangement enabling studies of a sample of
the installations from two suppliers to be conducted. The studies
included an analysis of levels of energy saving and other benefits
without publicly revealing sensitive information.
The resulting research projects were used to help the smart
meters implementation team to gain insights into the ways that
households are engaging with smart meters in practice, and what
could be done to improve the installation process. A particularly
useful finding for the team was the identification of two distinct
approaches towards using the in-home display (DECC, 2015b:
58). One group of users took an “information-driven approach”,
looking at the in-home display to see how much energy was being
consumed at a given moment. By contrast, those users who
adopted a “monitoring approach” would use the device to
monitor their energy use—for example, by checking if any
appliances could be switched off before leaving the house or going
to sleep, or by comparing their consumption on a daily basis.
These insights are consistent with STS literature in emphasizing
that decision makers should expect variation in users’ engage-
ment with technological devices (Oudshoorn et al., 2004: 44).
They thereby challenge the determinist view that new technol-
ogies will, of themselves, shape behaviours in universal and
predictable ways (Winner, 1980), which is said to be persistent
amongst policymakers (Wyatt, 2008).
Some of the social researchers’ studies attracted scrutiny from
economists within the department, who questioned the value of
qualitative research on samples that are not representative of the
broader population. However, the social researchers could
convincingly address the economists’ qualms by pointing to the
value in in-depth insights for developing ideas to improve
the roll-out process. As a result of the findings from these studies,
the team have since commissioned an action research project
designed to support them in developing good practice energy
efficiency advice and guidance materials for installers.
Reflecting on the social researchers’ commitment to providing
a challenge function, a policy official commented:
I think the social research people worry far more about this
than any other analytical discipline that I’ve come across. They
take it seriously. (A policy official in DECC (2)).
The same official revealed that this work led to the smart
meters implementation team winning an internal award for their
use of research.
This work is still on-going at the time of writing (summer
2016), but multiple interviewees have emphasized that that the
social researchers’ projects have enabled policy officials to develop
an evidence-based plan to improve how installers engage with
households. In turn, this could improve the extent to which
consumer benefits will be realized. Under favourable circum-
stances—in which DECC’s officials were committed to learning
from the foundation stage—social researchers were able to
effectively exercise challenge and thereby achieve visible and
immediate impact with the research they produced.
Constraints on the social research challenge function in DECC
The previous two sections have provided examples of social
researchers exercising an effective challenge function to address
issues within the Green Deal and smart metering policy areas. We
saw that naïve assumptions about citizens were confronted, and
that research efforts were made to gain empirical and robust
insights into how different citizens are likely to engage with the
government’s proposals. As such, these examples raise questions
over academic depictions of the civil service as resistant to
criticism (c.f. LSE GV314 Group, 2014).
However, DECC’s social researchers did identify contextual
constraints on their abilities to exercise challenge. Consistent with
the existing literature, social researchers reported a prevalence of
instrumental rationales amongst policy officials (Wynne, 1993;
Chilvers and Macnaghten, 2011: 539; Pallett and Chilvers, 2013),
and this limited researchers’ ability to provide useful challenge in
specific circumstances. While policy officials in the Green Deal
and smart meters teams deemed evidence about consumers
important to their objectives, the social researchers were aware
that analysis which is deemed to be ill-timed would not be well-
received nor reflect well on their professionalism. This issue was
particularly pertinent in the Green Deal and smart meters policy
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areas, since by the time that social researchers joined those teams
there was a strong ministerial drive for delivering both policies.
Researchers questioning or reframing core ideas would therefore
be “unwelcome” at that stage:
Insights from research that challenge at some level the basis on
which policies have been constructed—those insights are
unwelcome when the policy is being delivered—obviously they
are unwelcome. (A former social researcher in DECC (1)).
The analysts’ provision of challenge thus involves making a
situated judgement, which depends, at least in part, on whether
their insights could be constructively engaged with within the
current context. But as we saw in the previous sections, this did not
mean the researchers would hold back from challenge altogether.
Rather, they would apply their challenge towards what they deemed
achievable outcomes under the circumstances. This not only
resulted in a direct and immediate form of influence, but also laid
down the seeds for a gradual changing of the policy framings
informed by better understandings of citizens (Owens, 2015: 136).
The implication is that, as academic social scientists have advocated
for many years (Lowe et al., 2008)—and as is now appreciated by
policy officials in DECC, earlier engagement with social science
would provide opportunities for policy ideas to be designed with an
empirically informed understanding of citizens in mind.
A second constraint is found in the way that government analysts’
expertise is defined and assessed. Analysts in the civil service are
graded according to their competencies—as measured based on
their experiences—and this does not take into account their in-depth
knowledge with respect to a particular policy area.3 While this helps
to develop a versatile workforce, a knowledge gap can emerge. As
the former Head of Customer Insights explains below, this was an
issue preventing the effective exercise of challenge, at least when the
Customer Insight Team first began to expand:
I was thinking ‘oh, why aren’t they raising these things in
meetings? These things are really obvious.’ And then I thought
—the reason they are really obvious to me is that I’ve spent
five years talking to people about them! And my team haven’t!
And then I set about trying to close some of that gap so that
my team had a bit more of the knowledge that I had. (DECC’s
former Head of Customer Insight).
In this regard, it was fortunate that the Head of Customer
Insight came from outside of the civil service and could therefore
bring in topical knowledge based on many years of experience
conducting research about citizens’ engagement with energy and
environment issues.
Last, social researchers described an epistemic hierarchy within
the structures of the civil service, such that social researchers are
among the least senior officials in department and often least
well-resourced, while economists, scientists and engineers are
afforded more influence. This does not always work against social
researchers—as we saw previously, some scientists and econo-
mists used their influence to make the case for DECC to employ
social researchers in the first place. But, occasionally, these actors
make unempirical claims about citizens which trouble social
researchers. As one researcher recalled, challenging analysts at the
most senior level in the department was “probably the single
hardest thing to manage”:
You know there are ways of doing it, but there’s also reasons
why you wouldn’t in certain instances, because you wanna
kind of build their trust, not just show that you’re a kind of
arsey social scientist who’s always critical. (A former social
researcher in DECC (4)).
This perspective is particularly revealing when taken in
contrast with the explanation provided by GO-Science for
analysts holding back on challenge (Government Office for
Science, 2013: 20). It shows that while confidence may be a factor
for some researchers, the difference in civil servants’ relative
status in the department can compel a confident analyst to “pick
battles”, rather than to challenge every time one disagrees with a
senior colleague.
Conclusions
This article has provided clear examples of government social
researchers providing a challenge function within the Green Deal
and smart meters policy areas. As we may have expected given
the literature, the inclusion of social researchers in these policy
areas was predicated on instrumental rationales, rather than a
commitment to encourage reflection on how citizens are
imagined (Wynne, 1993; Chilvers and Macnaghten, 2011;
Pallett and Chilvers, 2013). The researchers were expected to
help maximize the uptake of the Green Deal among citizens, and
to ensure that consumer benefits from the smart meters roll-out
would be as high as possible. But, consistent with Owens’s
observation that under the right circumstances experts need not
be constrained by the instrumental role ascribed to them (Owens,
2015: 16), social researchers went beyond the instrumental
functions that they were expected to perform. This was most clear
in the case of the Green Deal, where the researchers challenged
the assumption that this was an appropriate scheme for engaging
all types of people across society. In this light, claims that
instrumental rationales preclude transformative learning about
citizens seem misguided. Rather, more empirical studies are
required to understand the circumstances in which better
understandings of citizens do constructively challenge policy-
makers’ assumptions.
Experts’ vying for epistemic recognition within the UK’s civil
service is not a new phenomenon. Historians have written similar
accounts highlighting the contingent political and institutional
reasons why medical and natural science expertise came to be
appreciated and institutionalized within Whitehall (Gummett,
1980; Clarke, 2007; Sheard, 2010). However, what is novel here is
the observation that there is now formal recognition of the
importance of evidence-based challenge itself in contributing to
the effectiveness of a government body. To this end, individual
analysts are held to account on the challenge they provide, and
rewarded when this is deemed effective. This, in itself, is a
commendable step towards improving the UK government’s use
of scientific advice.
But the civil service (and GO-Science in particular) could go
further by supplementing individualist accounts of challenge with
a greater appreciation of the social and material context that can
shape its effective operation. We have seen that social researchers’
influence depends on factors such as whether policy officials seek
their advice at an early enough stage in the policy process, the
encouragement they receive from senior figures (for example, the
Cabinet Office’s capability reviews team and the National Audit
Office), the rapport they have built with their colleagues, the
resources at their disposal, and their relative status in the civil
service hierarchy. More attention to these issues may aid GO-
Science and others to strengthen analysts’ capacity to challenge
where this is found amiss.
Notes
1 Although some writers pointed out that the finance was relatively cheap as it was fixed
for the period of the agreed plan, and would be covered through the savings made by
the household (Guertler et al., 2013: 157).
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2 This assessment was justified at the time of writing, prior to the transfer of DECC’s
responsibilities to the new Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
under Theresa May’s Conservative Government. (Rincon, 2016).
3 See Adam Cooper’s article in this thematic collection for more on the matter of topical
expertise in the civil service.
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